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Who represents "citizens" or "the public" in complex policy
negotiations? Mediation of a development dispute in Denver
provides one answer.

The Role of Citizens Groups
in Policy Conflicts
James E. Kunde, Jill E. Rudd

Perhaps no problem is more vexing and full of contradictions for policy
mediators than how to represent "citizens” or “the public” in negotiations involving formal representatives of official governing bodies whose
jurisdiction includes those citizens. Not only is there the uncomfortable
question of how people not formally chosen by an official process can be
equated to those who are, but also the question of which citizens or
members of the public will receive recognition while others do not. Both
of these questions were central in recent negotiations in the Southeast
Corridor of Metropolitan Denver, where representatives of the Conflict
Clinic attempted to facilitate joint problem solving among disputing
cities, a county, developers, business leaders, and citizens over annexation
and public infrastructure questions.
A series of disputes in the Southeast Corridor developed over the past
decade as the Denver Tech Center, one of the nation’s earliest research
parks, located and expanded at the junction of I-25 South and the 1-225
by-pass south of the city. A commercial real estate boom coupled with
liberal state laws for the formation of special districts enabled the devel
opment of an extensive area of tax "plums,” which attracted aggressive
annexation interests in nearby cities. The problem was complicated by
state laws in Colorado, which in essence provide contract zoning for land

brought into a municipality under annexation agreements. Initial con
tract zoning was established by the courts to supersede subsequent actions
by local governing bodies or initiative petitions.
The contract zoning feature had encouraged developers to seek competitive annexation bids to guarantee inclusion of the most favorable
zoning features. Other factors, such as low rates of taxation and commitment to provide more expensive infrastructure, had resulted in a complex
game involving chiefly local public officials and legal representatives of
developers’ interests.
Left out of these intricate bidding wars were the increasing numbers
of new homeowners in the area who sometimes found that a municipality
had annexed the entire area surrounding them and left their subdivision
without a commercial or industrial tax base to support the more expen
sive urban services that would surely come with increasing population
density. A group of homeowners became increasingly angry at the result
of the annexation battles and banded together to seek incorporation of a
new city called Centennial, which covered much of the unincorporated
area left in the corridor. The incorporation petition was resisted by com
peting municipalities and the county government but was most directly
opposed by developers who would be included in the incorporation. The
developers were concerned because incorporation would preclude their
ability to bargain for favorable development conditions among compet
ing governments. The developers were especially concerned because an
incorporation would not provide the same ironclad zoning protection
they had enjoyed under annexation contracts.
The developers’ legal representatives were able to stop the incorpora
tion in court on a correctable technicality. It was clear that a second
effort by the homeowners might easily succeed, and the issue already had
cost the developers more than $200,000 in legal fees.
An Ad Hoc Group Organizes to Seek Help

Shortly after the incorporation court case was decided, an ad hoc
group of homeowners, developers, and public officials began to consider
the idea of mediation to help the parties come together and seek out less
expensive ways to solve problems in the area. One of the members of the
group had heard about the negotiated investment strategy (NIS) developed by the Kettering Foundation as an intergovernmental problem-solving tool. NIS is a process that uses the structure and techniques of formal
mediation for exploring problem solving and joint action by governments
even though a formal dispute might not exist (Moore and Carlson, 1984).
In 1986 the ad hoc group contacted James Kunde, who had supervised
the development of the NIS process for the Kettering Foundation. Kunde
assembled a team under a contract with the Conflict Clinic to explore
how a mediated process similar to NIS could work given the problems of

the Southeast Corridor. The team included Kunde as project manager,
Carl Moore from Kent State University as the principal facilitator,
Roberta Miller from Watertown, Massachusetts, Blaine Liner from the
Urban Institute, Anita Fonte from the Maverick Institute in Tucson,
Arizona, Carol Farquhar from the Kettering Foundation, and Jill Rudd
from Kent State University.
As interviews and discussions proceeded with the principals, a struc
ture involving five negotiating teams emerged: the city of Aurora, the
city of Greenwood Village, Arapahoe County, concerned developers, and
homeowners. As discussions developed, a number of other entities such
as Cherry Creek School District and Castlewood Fire District became
observers. Under the ground rules agreed on, there would be only the five
teams represented by up to four persons with authority to participate.
As the participants reached the stage of establishing a steering com
mittee, negotiating teams, and ground rules, the most difficult issue
became how to represent the homeowners in the discussions. Both the
developers and homeowners teams differed from the teams representing
formal governing bodies. While the discussions were established from
the beginning as exploratory and nonbinding from a legal standpoint, it
was clear that there would be public scrutiny of the process and that
representation at the table would almost certainly be challenged.
The representation of developers was quickly resolved by two ad hoc
meetings with a majority of the larger developers active in the area.
Earlier, the active developers in the area had formed the Joint Southeast
Public Improvement Association (JSPIA) to coordinate their work with
the special districts created to build an initial infrastructure. While it
was decided that JSPIA was not appropriate to represent the developers’
interests at the table, the JSPIA network was useful in pulling together
the ad hoc meetings. The meetings established a team that represented
the major developers involved, and developed a communications process
for the representatives at the table to keep in touch with other interested
developers during the course of discussions.
The process for establishing a developers team raised some of the
same representation questions involved in establishing a homeowners
team, but the process was more straightforward. The number of potential
parties was infinitely smaller. There were less than two dozen major
developers active in the area. While the representation question later
broadened to include consideration of businesses that were not develop
ers, the group was still more manageable because of the existence of an
active chamber of commerce and regular communication among most
members of the business community. The same was not true of the homeowners, an unstructured group of individuals and family units related
only by accidental affinity and common anxiety about the future of their
neighborhoods.

How should homeowners and other groups composed of consumers,
clients, and otherwise unrelated citizens be represented in policy processes
affecting their interests? Should they have special representation beyond
the elected officials in their county, city, ward, or precinct? Who should
determine their stake? Before answering these questions in the Denver
case, we turn to a review of theories of representation and an appraisal of
why formal governmental processes do not always provide an adequate
place at the table.
The Inadequacies of Formal Governmental Representation
There are two fundamental conditions that may create a demand by
citizens for direct representation at a negotiating table when formal gov
ernmental representatives are also present. First, there are times when a
governmental body acting on behalf of its interests finds itself at odds
with the interests of a group of citizens. Neighborhood zoning issues or
siting of a waste disposal plant are good examples. The citizen group at
odds with the governing body is clearly defined by its specific interest, for
example, the impact on its neighborhood. In this situation, the affected
group may elect representatives or the issue may be so narrow that anyone
concerned can be seated and participate.
The second condition is present when the limits of representative
action are at issue. In this instance, the standard is public permission.
Mathews (1984) suggests that the roots of the public permission idea in
American political thought go back at least to the Greeks. The roots of
the word private in ancient Greek suggest incompleteness. The Greek
concept of private was highly personal, referring to those things that one
kept behind the front door of the house. Public, on the other hand, had
its roots in the word pubes, meaning maturity or fulfilling. Public life in
this context meant the world outside the front door, which was a great
deal more than government.
As the American democracy took shape in the latter eighteenth century, it did so in a place where people were convinced about the value of
the individual and skeptical about government. They were also very skeptical about democracy. As a result they created a system that was filled
with checks and balances, one which could not operate unless there was
a consensus outside of government (at least among people who had the
appropriate skills and education to participate). Perhaps the most
astounding characteristic, according to Alexis DeTocqueville, was that
when Americans had a problem, they went to see their neighbor. They
did not go to the courthouse. Early New England employed the town
meeting as a way of doing business. Local government began simply as a
way for the neighbors to get together and get those things done that were
too big or complex for a small group of neighbors to accomplish.

The good government movement began in the early twentieth century.
In part, it was a response to a deteriorated public life caused by the
complexity of an industrial society. Cities of the industrial age emerged
as huge, complex melting pots. Good government began simply as advo
cacy for efficient systems to do what the public knew by consensus had to
be done: police the streets, collect the garbage, school the young. Stanley
(1984) suggests that in virtually all cases, government provided only part
of the solution to the problem. Education was more than schooling,
safety more than policing, and clean streets more than garbage pickup.
In each case, there was a public response that was more than government.
As the twentieth century developed, the idea of professionalism grew
along with a more complex society. As the questions got more complex,
the answers seemed to require more professionalism. American education,
city management, and justice all became increasingly professional, and
services delivered by government became technically better. The forum
for discussion of ideas outside of government had been the neighborhood.
In the latter twentieth century, it tended to move to city hall and became
part of the government. Mathews suggests that the idea of local profes
sional service delivery worked well for Americans when the task was
driven by public consensus. However, when decisions about what services
to deliver moved inside government, “we the people” quickly became
“they the government.”
Paradoxically, throughout the period of growing professionalism, the
nation continued a long-term trend toward greater democratization. Even
while the public life declined in the neighborhoods, broader suffrage,
civil rights, direct primaries, and popular referendums became part of
government practice. It was probably inevitable that the two trends would
clash. The confusion of the 1970s found governmental administrators
tom between a demand for achievement and a demand from all sides to
be heard. A nation whose government could put a man on the moon
appeared unable to desegregate the schools or construct a suitable welfare
program.

Consensus and Agreement to Act

In the face of these emerging conditions, new models of governance
and the management of input have developed in American metropolitan
areas. Such models include public-private partnerships, increasing
reliance on task forces and broadly based citizens’ groups, and attempts
to apply collaborative and consensual problem-solving models to issues
once thought soluble only through formal political action. The big city
mayor or county executive who can amass sufficient political consent to
act directly and forthrightly is rare. Federal cutbacks since 1980 have
combined with increasing complexity of problems and the veto power

tactics learned by virtually every interest group in the 1960s to require
more attention to negotiation and consensus building with and among
constituencies.
In 1963 Williams and Adrian reported that those Michigan cities in
their sample that worked best had home-based industries whose leaders
recruited political leadership. The authors described cities where part
nerships, collaboration, and consensus were possible—cities envied
because they could get so much accomplished.
Since the late 1960s the nature of collaboration and consensus in
urban governance has been changing. More frequently, progress has
been the product of negotiation. The structures for action have been
alliances—always temporary—that did not sacrifice the self-interest of
the parties. The underpinning for negotiation of alliances was not con
sensus. Rather the basis for negotiation was a recognition by a critical
mass of the public that a problem had to be solved and that action was
necessary to solve it. The latter provided public permission for leaders
to negotiate an agreement that would solve a specific problem. The
solution would be unlikely to satisfy everyone but, to most of the public,
it would provide a sense that sufficient action had been taken.
One advantage of bringing individuals together for direct representation in negotiations is that the process permits the individual participants
to test and legitimize their conflicting values and attitudes. More important, the negotiation process provides the opportunity for creation of a
shared belief or vision, which can only be created through group discussion. Bormann (1985) defines vision as a unified or shared belief that
belongs to the group rather than any one individual. Creation of a shared
vision as a result of the negotiation process is synergistic and provides
the force for movement and change.

Homeowner Representation in the Arapahoe Case
In the Southeast Corridor dispute, virtually all of the homeowners
involved were citizens of Arapahoe County—which had formal status at
the table. Arapahoe County is governed by a three-person elected board
of county commissioners, a set of separately elected officials such as sher
iff and auditor, and numerous official public commissions including a
planning commission that works with a staff hired by the county man
ager. Arapahoe County covers 820 square miles, has a population of
385,221, and is organized into 12 political subdivisions. Like many units
of government that include both incorporated cities and unincorporated
areas, some services are provided throughout the county, and others are
provided only to unincorporated areas. Because of the size and the com
plexity of the county, it is difficult for citizens to feel as close to county
officials as they might feel to officials of a smaller governmental unit. In

fact, lack of identity and lack of representation on major issues were the
two biggest concerns named by homeowners in prenegotiation interviews
and in problem statements at the table.
The homeowner representation issue in Arapahoe County had elements of both causes for representation demands. The homeowners were
aggrieved parties to a specific action proposed (for example, annexations), and there also was a general concern that governance of the entire
unincorporated area involved only "them"—the professional governmental officials of the various political subdivisions and special districts.
Seating homeowner representatives presented several options to the
initial ad hoc steering committee, whose purpose was to consider how
to structure further discussions in the Southeast Corridor. The options
were to:
1. Precisely define the geographic boundaries of the affected area and
call on recognized homeowner associations within that area to
come together and select representatives for the process.
2. Ask the board of county commissioners to appoint a group of
people to represent the homeowners.
3. Represent the homeowners’ interest through the group that
had banded together to attempt to incorporate the new city of
Centennial.
A major high-profile selection process (the first option) was consid
ered seriously, but it had two strong disadvantages. First, it would require
an extensive and time-consuming effort to assemble a credible and highprofile process to select citizens. Another important issue for some was
that it would have created a new entity that none of the other parties
wanted.
Appointment by the county commission would have been regarded by
many of the concerned homeowners as preemption of the most important
issue—the right to express concerns contrary to the interests of the official
governmental bodies.
The ad hoc steering committee concluded that the third optionusing the citizen group that had started the incorporation effortemerged as the only credible alternative. The citizens group had demon
strated that it had the power and the commitment necessary to do signif
icant damage to the interests of the other parties. Another incorporation
petition would be costly to fight. So, at least initially, the decision was
made to let power decide representation.
The Evolution of the Representation Issue at the Table. The process
facilitated by the team from the Conflict Clinic involved four major
steps. The first step was the formation of the official steering committee,
which met and mapped out the ground rules. The steering committee
was comprised of one member from each of the five teams: Arapahoe
County, the city of Aurora, the city of Greenwood Village, citizens

(mainly from the group that had organized the effort to incorporate the
proposed new city of Centennial), and business and commercial interests
(chiefly those business and commercial interests involved in the organization of JSPIA and the combined special districts authority). The steering
committee first met on July 29, 1987, and developed the official ground
rules. All members agreed on the ground rules and agreed to go forward
with the process.
Step 2 of the process was preparation for and participation in a ses
sion to jointly define the problems to be addressed. This step was com
pleted on August 23, resulting in a statement distributed to all the parties
for further study and review with constituents not at the table.
Step 3 of the process called for each team to develop a proposed
solution to the problems and present it at a joint session. During the
joint session on September 23, a single text process was used to combine
the proposals, sort out agreements, and decide on further work.
The fourth and final step of the process was to convert the prelimi
nary agreements into specific language and to agree on an ongoing sys
tem for working on unresolved issues.
Creation of the Interim Advisory Group. The teams developed goals,
options, and outcomes in the hope that an agreement also could be
reached on a structure for proceeding with implementation of the agree
ments. Analysis by the parties, led to the conclusion that the best out
comes were most likely to result from structural options that would be
the most difficult to agree on and implement. This led the members of
the drafting committee to suggest the creation of an interim advisory
group, which could proceed with efforts to implement the current agree
ments, pursue further discussions to develop other agreements, and con
sider how the long-term governance structure questions might be
handled. The discussions focused principally on how the wide variety of
interests within the unincorporated area could be brought together for
more effective and useful interaction with the special districts and munic
ipalities with essential concerns in the area (for example, potential annex
ation interests, major traffic arteries, and the Centennial Airport).
The proposed text for agreements reached in principle at the joint
session of September 23,1987, was then reviewed at the third joint session
on November 12, 1987. The text was prepared by the facilitators working
with a drafting committee representative of each party. While the agreements were reached in principle by all five parties, attendance at the
drafting committee meetings in October was difficult for some municipal
officials due to election campaign commitments. As a result, facilitators
and drafting committee members continuously checked specific language
of drafts by telephone and mail. The text represented language that was
reviewed and modified by everyone who sought input into the process.
At the fourth and final joint session, January 13, 1988, it became clear

to all of the parties that the heart of the agreement was the development
of an interim advisory group and the potential of the group to advise the
county commissioners on how to address the needs of the unincorporated
area of Arapahoe County. The negotiating teams decided that the county,
citizens, and business and commercial interests would be the signatories,
to an agreement that outlined the goals and procedures of the interim
advisory group. The two municipalities were not as likely to be affected
directly by the work of the interim advisory group. Moreover, to make
the agreement legally and politically acceptable to the municipalities, it
would have been necessary to substantially modify ideas that were very
important to the other three parties.
The parties discussed the need for an intergovernmental agreement
between Arapahoe County, the city of Aurora, and Greenwood Village.
The sections of the agreement articulating policies on annexation/incorporation, land use, and infrastructure provided an initial agenda for the
deliberation between the county and the two municipalities. The county
agreed to include the recommendations of the interim advisory group in
intergovernmental discussions with the two municipalities.
Formation of the interim advisory group (IAG) represented a major
change in the thinking of the county about the representation of citizens’
interests in development decisions. Portions of the agreement creating
the new mechanism are presented in Exhibit 1 as one model for dealing
with the policy and governance issues facing developing areas.
From Power to Principle. During the course of the Southeast Corridor
negotiations, representation evolved from a power-dictated model into a
principled model based on recognition by all parties of the need for
policy processes to be responsive to a wider range of citizens’ interests.
This recognition resulted in the interim advisory group, which is now
called the Southeast Corridor Priority Board and is being fully implemented in Arapahoe County. The initial homeowner representation was
extremely practical—it could be implemented immediately and could

Exhibit 1. Agreement to Form an Interim Advisory Group
The Arapahoe County Government will officially designate one or more advisory
bodies to deal with governance issues in unincorporated areas—beginning with a
group representing the area from Parker Road, south along the eastern boundary
of Centennial Airport to the Arapahoe County line and west to the City of Littleton. The Interim Advisory Group will consist of a body of ten persons, including
five business leaders representing business and commercial interests and businesses operating in the area and five residents representing homeowner organizations in the area. The residents shall be nominated at a session called by the
County Planning Department, using processes providing adequate notice to all
residents’ associations, where each Homeowner Association is entitled to send
one representative. Resident representatives are to be nominated by the representative homeowner associations. Business representatives are to be nominated by

Exhibit 1. continued
the following organizations: JSPIA—2; Centennial Chamber of Commerce—3.
All nominations have a right of veto by the Board of County Commissioners.
The Interim Advisory Group will be provided a staff person from the Planning Department of Arapahoe County and subject to approval by the IAG. Other
staff and clerical support are to be provided as needed. The IAG is expected to be
in operation by March 1, 1988.
The initial term of appointment for members shall be two years. If no agreement is reached on a permanent ongoing governance structure for the area and if
the IAG proves effective in solving problems, then it shall recommend an ongoing advisory body to replace it. The ongoing body should be in the same form,
chiefly business and resident representatives, but should be set up with staggered
terms of appointment to ensure continuity and a limitation on service to ensure
access of new people with new ideas.
Wherever possible, the consensus model of decision making should be used.
At least a two-thirds majority will be required for recommendations to be consid
ered as official (that is, seven votes) if and when a vote is necessary. It is recom
mended that when the ten original appointments are made, that ten alternates
(five residents and five business representatives) are chosen through the same
process. The alternates would be asked to vote for specific official representatives
when those official representatives are unable to be in attendance. On that basis,
it is recommended that an official quorum be comprised of at least eight official
representatives or their specific alternates.
The IAG will assume initiative to work on the following agenda and will
make primary recommendations to the Board of County Commissioners on capital
and operating budget decisions that significantly affect the area outlined. A primary recommendation is defined to mean that the Board of County Commissioners will treat that recommendation as at least equal to any operating department
or statutorily designated county government official. In other words, unless overall governing responsibility prevents the acceptance of the recommendation, the
County Commission will honor it.
A Proposed Agenda for the IAG
Working with Other Bodies as Appropriate
1. Develop a model annexation/incorporation procedures guide that is practical and embodies the spirit of the agreements.
2. Develop a model annexation/incorporation impact statement that is prac
tical and embodies the intent of the agreement.
3. Develop a set of criteria for a study of options to resolve the Cherry Creek
Crossing issue, in general accord with DRCOG 2010 Traffic and Transportation
Plan.
4. Plan revenue sharing agreements within the community of interest.
5. Develop a design for a County Development Authority or other vehicle to
provide equity participation by governmental bodies and other development assistance tools for development deemed to be in the public interest and to provide for
public/private cooperative actions to ensure high quality development in general
accordance with the comprehensive plan.
6. Prepare an implementation plan for essential infrastructure needs, with
proposed enabling legislation if required.

capture the willingness of the other parties to begin right now. However,
it lacked vision and stability for the long term. As the discussions pro
ceeded and representation clearly stood out as the issue, it was possible to
develop a vision for the longer term, which quickly led to the formation
of the LAG and its implementation as the Southeast Corridor Priority
Board.
The parties decided to begin implementation of the interim advisory
group concept before the final agreement was signed. A pilot interim
advisory group was formed under the terms established by the agreement
for the final 1AG, except that the initial citizen representatives were
appointed by the county commission based on recommendations from
the citizen negotiating team. The pilot IAG was given a two-month life
span and asked to make the following recommendations in two areas:
Should Arapahoe County begin development of a regional park system?
(2) Should Arapahoe County initiate a public/private economic development corporation?
The pilot IAG has begun operating while the process called for in
the agreement to name the official citizen representative gets under way.
When the pilot IAG completes its assignment, the ongoing body will
have been named, using the experience of the pilot to help set its ground
rules.
Conclusion
The Southeast Corridor dispute typifies increasing numbers of policy
and planning issues in metropolitan areas that involve specific citizen
interests not adequately represented through formal elective politics. It
also represents the increasingly frequent application of mediation or facil
itated negotiation to such problems and the complexity of preparing for
negotiations—that is, of getting to the table. Without solving the citizen
representation problem, no sound and lasting outcomes can be expected,
and policy making becomes gridlocked.
In recent interviews in the state of Washington, several parties
involved in the resolution of the controversial and long-standing salmon
fishery dispute enunciated a fundamental idea they had learned together
in the process: "think big, act small." In many ways, the Arapahoe
County process reflects the same lesson. Representation was a big issue,
and it required a big vision. But the vision was achieved—and the issue
put on track toward resolution—only through a series of very small and
practical steps at a representative table.
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